Religious Freedom, International Law and the People's Republic of China

Religious Freedom, International Law and the People's Republic of China

Chris Siefert
GOVT326 - International Law

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between international law and and religious freedom in the People's Republic of China. In order to do so, the facts of current situation of religious freedom on China must first be studied, as well as the current state of the right to religious freedom in international law. Finally, analysis will be done on the Chinese government's official position on religious freedom and options for influencing the Chinese to move their position into conformity with international law will be explored.

History and Background

Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has been in a continued state of conflict with various religious groups within its borders. Buddhists, Protestants, Muslims and Catholics, as well as believers in less globally prevalent religions, have all faced Chinese government-sponsored oppression in the last 50 years. This section will attempt to give the reader an understanding of the state of religious freedom in China, and will provide background information for further analysis.

From day one, the Catholic Church has never gotten along well with the government of the PRC. But to understand this, one must first understand the history of Catholicism in China. Although the Catholic Church had been involved in China since the 7th Century, the involvement level was never significant until the end of the Opium War (Freedom of Religious Belief in China I). At this point, operating under the ``Protectorate'' of the French Government in China its influence became more profound. This led to reactions against Catholic missionaries and churches as the tools of foreign imperialists. In the Boxer Rebellion, for example, Catholic missionaries ``were one of the targets to be attacked'' (Leung 38-39).

After the 1911 revolution, and the rise of the Nationalist government, the Catholic Church faired well. Since it was better organized locally than Protestant Churches, and less politically visible, it escaped the anti-Christian backlashes of the 1920s. With the dawn of the World War II, Catholic Church found itself in government favor and it supported the government's actions against Japanese aggression. Unfortunately, this same support would come back to haunt them with the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (Hanson 102-104). Catholics were subjected to increasing restriction -- hospitals, orphanages and schools were closed or seized by the state, the Chinese government outlawed both the Legion of Mary, a Catholic lay organization, and foreign missionary work. In 1951, Apostolic Internuncio Antonio Riberi, who was effectively the Holy See's ambassador to China, was placed under house arrest, and later expelled from China (Hanson 144-146).

Protestantism came to China with the the Europeans and the ``Age of Unequal Treaties.'' After the Boxer Rebellion, however, they took on a role of increased visibility in Chinese life, and hence were targeted with increasing vengeance in the late 1920s, during the Great Depression. Their most disastrous encounter with the Chinese Communist government came when, due to the Korean War in 1950, United States froze all Chinese assets in America. The Chinese government responded by forcing Protestants in China to sever all ties with American mission boards (Hanson 142-143).

The real mechanism for state control of religion was the ``Three-Self Movement,'' which quickly developed into today's ``Patriotic Associations.'' The Three-Self movement advocated ``self-administration, self-support and self-propagation'' for all religions in China (Freedom of Religious Belief in China, IV). The Three-Selves required complete religious and financial independence from foreigners. The Religious Affairs Bureau, established in 1951, was responsible for implementing this plan. Religious groups which failed to follow these rules, and join the appropriate Patriotic Association were outlawed (Hanson 124-130).

Protestant groups for the most part went along with the scheme, though grudgingly (Hanson 130). Catholics however, refused outright. To give up all ``foreign ties'' meant renouncing the Apostolic authority exercised by the Pope, which meant rejecting a critical belief of the Catholic faith. In the words of Pope John Paul II, ``A Catholic who wishes to remain such and to be recognized as such cannot reject the principle of communion with the successor of Peter [the Pope]'' (Cardinal Kung Foundation).

Over the next 50 years and until this day, the Chinese government would continue oppression of the Roman Catholic Church. The government beat and tortured Roman Catholic priests, bishops and laypersons, from then-Bishop Kung Pin-Mei of Shanghai in the 1950s to Bishop Su Xhimin of Baoding in 1996. The Catholic Patriotic Association also ordained its own bishops, despite the fact that doing so without Papal approval violates the tenets of the Catholic faith and results in an automatic ``latae sententiae'' excommunication for all those involved (Cardinal Kung Foundation; Code of Cannon Law 1382). Likewise, Protestants, Muslims and Buddhists also faced oppression to varying degrees. The 1996 Human Rights report of the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, says that, ``In 1996 police closed dozens of `underground' mosques, temples, and seminaries and hundreds of Protestant "house church" groups, many with significant memberships, properties, financial resources, and networks.''

Current International Law involving Religious Freedom

In order to discern the relationship between the policies of the Chinese government and international law, one must examine the body of international dealing with religious freedom. Specifically, what does international law say exactly, and what do international treaties guarantee about religious freedom?

Although the Treaty of Westphalia contains the first hints of a guarantee to safeguard religious freedom, it is the United Nations Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which bring the idea of religious freedom as a right into modern international law. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter proposes ``promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to...religion'' as a goal for the UN. It is Article 18 of the Universal Declaration that formalizes this as a ``right.'' It says the following:

``Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.''

The ideas outlined in the Universal Declaration form a basis for later treaties on the topic, providing a goal which would be ``fleshed out''. The first of these treaties was the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). In Article 2(1), the Covenant requests that each state party undertake ``to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as ...religion.'' In Article 20, it prohibits ``any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred,'' and in Article 27 it calls for religious minority groups to ``not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion.''

The United Nations Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief (1981) further expanded international law on the subject of religious freedom. This document is very explicit in the sort of freedoms it proposes. Specifically, Article 6 calls for the freedom:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, created at the 1993 World Human Rights Conference echoes the same ideas in Article 2(22), calling upon states to, ``take all appropriate measures in compliance with their international obligations...to counter intolerance and related violence based on religion or belief...recognizing that every individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, expression and religion.''

These four documents establish several major points about the right to religious freedom in the world. First of all, they suggest the existence of an international norm about the right to religious freedom. Though the Vienna Declaration and the UN Declaration are not necessarily be viewed as international custom at this point, it is quite possible to make the that argument for a large portion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Malanczuk 220). Perhaps even the Civil and Political Covenant contains ideas that are becoming customary law, as evidenced by the fact that over three-quarters of states have signed this Covenant. It is also important to note that even the government of China has recently signed the Civil and Political Covenant (UNHCHR Web Site). Together these documents imply the existence of a international norm about religious freedom, although these may be some disagreement as to what this freedom precisely entails and what the limits of religious freedom are.

It is this concept of limits of religious freedom which will be crucial for this discussion. The ideal for religious freedom is layed out in the above-mention documents, but there is still ambiguity as to what parameters around that ideal are considered acceptable conduct for states. Sullivan remarks that ``the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject to constraints imposed to protect other human rights and the various societal interests.'' But the treaties aren't clear on what exactly constitutes necessary restriction. After all, the Civil and Political Covenant does allow restriction on religious belief based on ``public morals,'' and ``the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.'' These are, of course, very sensible restrictions. In America, for example, the practice of human sacrifice would be considered offensive to public morals. But where should the line drawn? The Covenant doesn't provide an answer to that. Alston argues that such standard-setting efforts in the past have been ``duplicative, imprecise or incomplete'' (Ku and Diehl 360). Observing the same situation, Sullivan argues that, ``given the vagueness of these terms, there is a risk that states will cite them to justify restrictions on religious freedom imposed for reasons tantamount to national security interests, by arguing that a religious group is engaged in political activities that endanger public safety and order'' (496-499).

In conclusion, it seems as if it cannot be argued that the right to religious freedom does not exist. However, the precise nature of that right is unknown. At this point, it becomes necessary to study where the Chinese government thinks this line is, and to see if this vagueness in the law is exploited.

Analysis of the Chinese Government's Official Position

According to the Chinese government's ``White Paper'' on Freedom of Religious Belief in China, ``citizens of China may freely choose and express their religious beliefs, and make clear their religious affiliations (I).'' According to section II of this same ``White Paper'', the Chinese government feels that their protection of religious belief, is:

``basically in accordance with the main contents of the concerned international documents and conventions... stipulations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and the Vienna Declaration and Action Program are all included in China's laws and legislation in explicit terms and are being put into practice: that the freedom of religion or belief is a basic human right.''

Seeing these guarantees, it is difficult to imagine how the government of China could possibly be involved in the sort of oppression the Cardinal Kung Foundation, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State allege. After all, Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution of the PRC states that ``no state organ, public organization ...may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in any religion'' and that ``the state protects normal religious activities.'' The question of course becomes, what constitutes ``normal?'' (Religious Freedom Home Page)

The Chinese government finds that, ``in China, all individuals and organizations, including all religions, must safeguard the people's interests, the sanctity of law, ethnic unity and unification of the nation.'' They then go on to claim that ``No one in China is punished because of his or her religious belief. But no country that practices the rule of law in the world today would tolerate illegal and criminal activities being carried out under the banner of religion'' (Freedom of Religious Belief in China, II). That is a powerful condemnation of the underground religious in China. Evidently, the Chinese government finds the Roman Catholic faith and other religions like it to be somehow criminal. Of course Roman Catholicism is illegal, since it is not a registered religion and is unaffiliated with the Catholic Patriotic Association. This argument, however, is basically circular. The Chinese government would've never illegalized Catholicism in the first place if it didn't find it somehow threatening. So why do they feel it is a threat?

The motivation behind the Chinese government's actions shows itself in the fourth section of the White Paper, entitled ``Support for Independence and Initiative in Management of Religious Affairs.'' This section states that, ``China's religious affairs and religious bodies are not subject to any foreign domination.'' Freedom from foreign domination is an important right and moral value for the Chinese people, but to the Chinese government, ``freedom'' implies complete isolation from foreign religious hierarchies. The CCP statement in the Communist Kuan Min Daily on March 17, 1951 captures this sentiment quite well. It says that,

``China shall be freed from the control and the influence of the imperialists and their running dogs...Either the Chinese Church shall continue to be subjected to control by imperialist forces and employed as an instrument of aggression in the hands of aggressors and espionage agents, or else it shall cut itself completely off from imperialist forces in order to make itself a true institution of religion and not a refuge for evil influences.'' (Hanson 262)

The White Paper goes on to describe the Three-Self movement as ``advocating cutting off the relationship with imperialism in all aspects and setting up new churches on the basis of self-administration, self-support and self-propagation.'' For Roman Catholics, this entails cutting social, economic and spiritual ties with the Holy See. It is the Holy See (which is referred to incorrectly as ``The Vatican'' in the White Paper) that is the perceived threat to China.

The Chinese government finds that the Holy See ``plotted sabotage'' against the PRC, and ``issued papal encyclicals several times instigating hatred against the new people's political power among the converts.'' Likewise, they recall missionary involvement in European exploitation and thus associate the Catholic Church with imperialism (Freedom of Religious Belief in China, IV). This suggests that it is the Holy See's source of authority, which is external to that of the state and the party which causes the Chinese government to react, branding Roman Catholicism as a tool of American aggression.

Leung makes another argument in her book on Sino-Vatican Relations. She feels that it is precisely the magisterium (or authority to teach) ``that has been the main reason for church-state conflict in the PRC.'' She goes on to say that ``the magisterium of world religious such as Buddhism, Islam and Christianity has been posing challenges to the teaching authority of the CCP.'' Leung finds that the Three-Selfs movement and the patriotic associations are specific instances of this reaction against religious magisterium. She says that, ``The launching of the Three-Selfs movement among Christians and establishment of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association were concrete measures by the political leaders in Beijing to curb the magisterium of Christianity'' (Leung 340-341). The author of this study feels that the following words from Ad Apostolorum Principis, an encyclical of Pope Pius XII which was sent to China, captures this fear of church magisterium expressed by the Chinese government.

``However, if Christians are bound in conscience to render to Caesar (that is, to human authority) what belongs to Caesar, then Caesar likewise, or those who control the state, cannot exact obedience when they would be usurping God's rights or forcing Christians either to act at variance with their religious duties...Under such circumstances, every Christian should cast aside all doubt and calmly and firmly repeat the words with which Peter and the other Apostles answered the first persecutors of the Church: `We must obey God rather than men.'''
(Sections 23 and 24)

Leung's arguments, the White Paper and Kuan Min Daily statement, illustrate the fact that the Chinese government sees the maintenance of the teaching authority of the state and the party as the key to maintaining order in China. It seems that religious ``independence...as a part of the Chinese people's struggles against colonialist and imperialist aggression and enslavement,'' and the necessity of maintaining the teaching authority of the CCP is important enough to constitute one of these vital ``public morals'' mentioned in the Civil and Political Covenant (Freedom of Religious Belief in China, IV). Thus the Chinese government allows itself to apply a ``special'' standard of religious freedom.

Promoting Religious Freedom in China with International Law

Before one can discern how international law can change Chinese policy, one must first ask, ``What has the effect of law been on Chinese policy?'' It has been argued that China simply signs international agreements and then completely ignores them. According to this theory, China would be signing these agreements simply to placate the international community, and the law itself has little effect on the Chinese government's decision making process.

The author would like to respectively disagree with this opinion, however. The very existence of the ``White Paper'' on Freedom of Religious Belief in China says something. It says that China feels obligated to explain their policy to the outside world. Along with several other ``White Papers'' on human rights, these documents form China's statement to the world to attempt to persuade those who would believe them that, ``Citizens of China may freely choose and express their religious beliefs, and make clear their religious affiliations.'' In fact, the Chinese government makes it clear that they are following the ``main contents'' of international law (I). If international law did not matter, the Chinese government would not have published the White Paper to begin with. It clearly feels that this international norm does exist, and that they have to explain their deviance from it in some way.

The next question that must be answered before analysis can continue is one concerning the limits of law. How far can law go? The Chinese government is struggling to rid itself of ``foreign'' influence. How much pressure can other states apply to China to promote religious freedom before this fear becomes self-fulfilling? No international body can successfully legislate upon China a plan of action rejected by the Chinese government. The Chinese government can just simply choose to not sign any treaty that they don't feel to be representative of their interests.

Likewise, it is difficult to imagine a state unilaterally ``enforcing'' international law against the Chinese. The use of force in such a case is not in concordance with the ICJ ruling in the Nicaragua Case, where it said that force ``could not be the appropriate method to...ensure...respect'' for human rights. Without the use of force, is difficult to imagine that any political or economic leverage could be used by a state to unilaterally force the Chinese to change their policy (Malanczuk 221). The situation involving most-favored nation trade status in the United States in 1993 and 1994 shows the inability of even the most powerful of states (namely, the US) to force China to implement certain standards of human rights through political means.

The corollary to this question is whether or not a multilateral enforcement program would work. The success of such a program would be unlikely. As explained above, the Chinese are so averse to foreign ``imperialist'' influence. Since they have had a history of relative economic isolation, that they may be willing to risk returning to that state rather than conforming to Western demands. Though this is purely speculation on the part of the author, it seems to be in keeping with Chinese policy.

Analysis of the International Religious Freedom Act

The Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (H.R. 2431), later renamed the International Religious Freedom Act was signed into law by President Clinton on October 27, 1998. Its goal, according to sponsoring congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA), is to ``send a message of hope to millions of suffering people worldwide who are being persecuted for their religious beliefs'' and to ``help loosen the chains of government oppression endured by many today'' (Statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf). The question to be dealt with here is whether this bill, as it was originally proposed, or as it was signed into law, would be an effective tool in promoting religious freedom in China. The major difference in the bill as originally introduced by Rep. Wolf, and the bill that President Clinton signed into law, was the section on sanctions. It is sanctions methodology that will form the basis for this analysis.

The IRFA defines ``Category 1 religious persecution'' to be ``religious persecution that is conducted with the involvement or support of government officials or its agents, or as part of official government policy'' (Thomas H.R. 2431.IH(3)). If the evidence outlined above is representative of the situation in China, then it is clear that China would be declared a state engaging in Category 1 religious persecution. If so, then the original version of the bill would automatically institute sanctions on China. It would prohibit all exports, and prohibit any American citizen or company from exporting anything to entities within the state engaged in religious persecution. It prohibit all exports, and prohibit all American citizens and companies from exporting goods and services that facilitate religious persecution. In addition, it would prevent any US assistance to the Chinese government, and shall have the ``United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use his or her best efforts to deny, any loan or other utilization of the funds of their respective institutions (other than for humanitarian assistance) to that country'' (Thomas H.R. 2431.IH(7)).

The version of the bill that was signed into law, however, is a bit more lenient to offending states. It requires the President to take action against the offending state. This action would range from ``(1) A private demarche'' to ``(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations'' (Thomas H.R. 2431.ENR(405)). This modified version of the bill doesn't automatically take out the proverbial ``elephant gun,'' and allows the President the discretion to choose the sort of sanction he feels would be most effective.

So how would the Chinese government react to either version of these bills? The original version of the bill would probably lead to a conflict between the United States and China similar to that of MFN renewal, but on a larger scale. This heavy-handed version leaves the Chinese two choices -- either they conform the the US desires, or they suffer fairly significant economic sanctions. In all likelihood, the Chinese would respond by giving American companies the economic ``cold shoulder'', and seeking forbidden goods and services from Europe instead. It would also, in the author's opinion, give the Chinese more ``proof'' that religious groups, especially the Christians, are tools of American imperialism. On these grounds, the author of this study finds that the original bill would be a poor tool to promote religious freedom in China.

The version of the IRFA which was passed into law is much less offensive. Though it would give the United States the ability to harshly punish China when it wanted to, most likely the US would either privately or publicly reprimand the Chinese government at each review, but would otherwise let Beijing off the hook. The author has difficulty seeing how this could be harmful to the promotion of religious freedom in China, as Washington reprimands Beijing often enough anyway. On the grounds of this flexibility, the author finds that the final version of the IRFA may be a helpful tool for promoting religious freedom in China.

Promoting Religious Freedom in China with International Norms

In her book, National Interests in International Society, Finnemore outlines a methodology for international law to affect the conduct of states which does not involve unilateral or multilateral exercise of political pressure on the targeted state. Finnemore's work with international norms suggests that simply by developing international law, norms and customs dealing with a particular issue will eventually influence state policy. Much as human beings are socialized into a society and thus internalize its values, states are socialized into international society and internalize some of its values. She goes on to say that,

``State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate That normative context influences the behavior of decisionmakers...The normative context also changes over time, and as internationally held norms and values change, they create coordinated shifts in state interests'' (2).

It is argued above that the existence of the governmental ``White Paper'' on religious freedom shows evidence that the Chinese government feels obligated to explain its deviance from the international norm regarding religious freedom. As a corollary, the existence of the ``White Paper'' can be taken as evidence of this norm's existence, but does this mean they've internalized this norm? Is there any proof whatsoever that China has internalized these ideas? In order to answer this question, one must look briefly at the views taken by the Chinese toward international law in the 1950's and 1960's, and comparing that with views today.

In the those early years, the People's Republic was fairly antithetical to the ideals of international law. As Cohen and Chiu point out, China embarked on a policy of ``militant anti-imperialism'' that put them at odds with much of the international system, including the U.N., which still refused them membership (20). International law was still seen strictly through through the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao. As Ying T'ao wrote in 1960, ``the bourgeoisie carefully conceal the class character of international law''. He goes on to say that ``bourgeoisie international law reflects only the will and the need of the ruling class of big capitalistic powers'' (Cohen and Chiu 30). This statement suggests an antagonism to such a tool of the west. Also, in 1957 Ho Wu-shuang and Ma Chün wrote that, ``after the liberation, we must in principle deny the bourgeois 'science' of international law, just as we deny other branches of bourgeois social science'' (Cohen and Chiu 35). These statements, as well as those by other Chinese authors of the period make it quite clear that international law derived from the West is clearly at odds with the ideology of Communism.

Today, however, the situation is somewhat different. The Chinese government is now a party to many international agreements, including many concerning human rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Ratified 1981), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Accession 1982), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Ratified 1988), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Ratified 1992). Likewise, the Chinese government has also recently signed the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and has since become a member of the United Nations (UNHCHR Web Site). Seeing this, it becomes evident that the People's Republic has become much friendlier toward international law, and has become a party to several treaties involving human rights.

But has this been internalized into Chinese law and governing practice? With reference to certain human rights issues, the results have been fairly dramatic. As Lauren argues, ``in the name of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it [China] actively supported strong punitive measures against the 'pariah regimes' of the white minority in South Africa...and of Israel for its suppression of the rights of Palestinians''(295). At least in these areas, this internalization of international norms has shown some effect.

There also seems to have been some internalization of international norms involving religious freedom in China, as Article 36(1) of the 1982 Constitution guarantees it, at least in name (Religious Freedom Home Page). Likewise, Article 251 of Criminal Law outlines punishment for state employees who violate legal exercise of religious freedom by citizens (Freedom of Religion in China, III). This seems to suggest that even in this very minimal fashion, some form of this norm has been internalized. As a comparison, one must recall that previous dynastic rulers of China had banned entire faiths outright.

Since some international law has already been internalized by China, it follows that this process may have the potential to cause further change. The question becomes how this would be done. The author of this study would like to suggest two methods through which this may be achieved. First of all, international discussion has the potential to bring about changes in state policy in and of itself. Secondly, further treaty negotiation and implementation, especially focusing on making protections for religious freedom more explicit, can promote international law in a way that can be internalized by states.

With regards to international discussion, the author finds that such dragging out in the daylight of ``dirty laundry'' of states and its honest discussion can help promote human rights. Lauren makes a similar argument about meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights. He says that, ``it possesses an influential deterrent value, for few nations relish the prospect of standing before this huge and potentially hostile group...and being called on to publicly defend their record on human rights in light of internationally established norms before the opinion of the world. In fact, it normally is sufficient to compel most governments to expend considerable energy to comply with the universal standards in advance.'' He points to such an occurrence at the 1997 session, where the Chinese ambassador, ``found himself surrounded by news media that nearly smothered him and in the unenviable position of accusing most human rights activists of `outrageous distortion' and `sanctimonious posturing' '' (277-278).

NGOs also have a potential of facilitation this sort of discussion. They could act in a more traditional agenda-setting role, or as more recently demonstrated with the Land Mines Ban, act in a policy-creation role. In addition to contributing to international discussion, they also help to give other states the domestic political will in order for them to actively support international norms for human rights in general and religious freedom specifically. Lauren sees NGOs as essential in this approach, acting in such roles as they ``provide support for the promotion of human rights, lobby for continued standard setting'' and ``apply pressure for serious implementation of existing treaties'' (287).

Working further on treaties can also promote religious freedom in a fashion that can be internalized by states. Not only will such treaties eventually become evidence of developing international customary law involving religious freedom, but they can also more explicitly proscribe what is acceptable conduct and what is not. Alston supports this position, arguing that previous ``international human rights standard-setting efforts have sometimes been duplicative, imprecise or incomplete'', and that such a problem needs to be addressed in future treaty work (Ku and Diehl 360). Better definitions of what religious freedom entails could be written into treaties which could then become law. For example, the Three-Self ideal of ``self-administration,'' as interpreted by the Chinese, could be designated as unacceptable. A new treaty could explicitly allow the ability of religious people to maintain full spiritual ties to their hierarchies in other lands, in order to tell the Chinese that their conduct is not acceptable. Likewise, a treaty could make more explicit the type of conduct that should be allowed for religious groups. A better definition of the terms ``public morals'' and ``fundamental rights and freedoms of others'' could only help to eliminate the loopholes exploited by the Chinese government.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the sort of religious freedom that the typical American expects does not exist in China. The Chinese government maintains that different standards are to be maintained in order to prevent foreign imperialism, and to maintain the teaching authority of the CCP. This study finds heavy political pressure, including the original version of the IRFA would be unsuitable tools for promoting religious freedom in China. However, the revised IRFA and internalization of international norms through international discussion and treaty negotiation and implementation may be better tools for promotion of these rights.

``In the name of the common good public authorities are bound to respect the fundamental and inalienable rights of the human person''
-Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1907

References

1

Alston, P. The UN's Human Rights Record: From San Francisco to Vienna and Beyond Ku, Charlotte and Diehl, Paul, ed. ``International Law : Classic and Contemporary Readings.'' Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

2

Cardinal Kung Foundation. Ed. Joseph M. C. Kung. 27 April 1999.

3

''Catechism of the Catholic Church.'' Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana : 1994.

4

``Code of Cannon Law.'' Cannon Law Society of Great Britian. London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1983.

5

Cohen, Jerome and Chiu, Hungdah. People's China and International Law : A Documentary Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974.

6

Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

7

Hanson, E. O. The Chinese state and the Catholic Church : The Politics of religion within the Confucian-Sectarian Dynamic. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1976.

8

``International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'' Fletcher School Multilateral's Project. 21 Mar. 1999.

9

Lauren, Paul G. The Evolution of International Human Rights : Visions Seen. Philidelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

10

Leung, B. Sino-Vatican Relations : Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976-1986. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

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Malanczuk, Peter, ed. Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law. London: Routledge 1997, 7^th ed.

12

People's Republic of China. Information Office of the State Council. Freedom of Religious Belief in China 20 March 1999.

13

Pope Pius XII. Ad Apostolorum Principis. 29 June 1958. New Advent Catholic Web Site. 21 Apr. 1999.

14

Religious Freedom Home Page Christian Science Committee on Publication, Boston. 10 April 1999.

15

Sullivan, Donna J. ``Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination.'' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 82, Issue 3 (Jul. 1988), 487-520.

16

Library of Congress. ``Thomas - U.S. Congress on the Internet.'' 14 Apr. 1999.

17

``United Nations Charter.'' United Nations Web Site. 23 March 1999.

18

``United Nations Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief.'' UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 21 Mar. 1999.

19

United States. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 20 Apr. 1999

20

``Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'' United Nations Web Page. 20 Mar. 1999.

21

``Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.'' Project Diana : Online Human Rights Archive, Yale Law School. 10 Apr. 1999

22

Wolf, Frank R. ``Statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf.'' 20 Apr. 1999.

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